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Hunt: The Panama Canal Treaties: Past, Present, Future

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: PAST,
PRESENT, FUTURE
E. L. Roy HUNT*
Two years have elapsed now since the January riots of 1964. Immediately after the riots, as upon previous occasions, a clamor sounded
throughout Panama for seizure and nationalization of the Canal,
though significantly the clamor, despite a three-month hiatus in
diplomatic relations, was not an official one. At the same time there
sounded again in other quarters of the world what may more aptly be
described as a murmur in favor of internationalization of the Canal.
Neither, of course, has occurred. Instead the United States and
Panama have for the past several months been engaged in discussions
both in Washington and Panama, discussions which President Johnson
has recently announced will result in a new treaty. And this despite
the United States' insistence that it is doing so under no legal
compulsion!
Three broad but interrelated questions are posed:
(1) Why is the United States discussing a new treaty if it is
under no legal compulsion to do so?
(2) Why has Panama taken no action to terminate unilaterally
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty1 of 1903?
(3) Why has the world community made no move toward internationalizing the Canal, thus assuring the most inclusive possible use of such a vital waterway?
It is at once apparent that the greatest problem confronted is
that of accommodating inclusive and exclusive interests.2 On the
lowest level of abstraction this accommodation must be achieved in
the particular context of a bilateral treaty and its related agreements.
Immediate attention is directed to the danger of assuming, without
appropriate verification, that the words of treaties mirror community
expectations. In the context presently to be considered there is serious
*B.A. 1955, Vanderbilt University; LL.B. 1960, University of Mississippi; LL.M.
1962, Yale University; Member of the Mississippi Bar Association and the American
Bar Association; Associate Professor of Law and Acting Assistant Dean, University
of Florida.
1. Convention With the Republic of Panama for the construction of a ship
canal to connect the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, 33
Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431. Although this treaty is the keystone of our relations with
Panama, it must be considered in conjunction with the revisions of 1936 and 1955.
2. The author is indebted to Professors McDougal and Lasswell for the
analytical approach suggested in their article: McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Amr. J. INT'L L. 1
(1959). A slightly different version appears in McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

3-41 (1960).
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doubt whether community expectations were shared even at the time
of commitment; certainly they have been modified as new conditions
have arisen.
Inclusive interests refer to the demands and expectations that
affect collective processes to a degree significant enough to bring
more than a single nation-state into control of the process. For
clarity one must distinguish inclusive interests in regard to impact or
"use," and authorized control or "competence." Inclusive use refers
to a process in which all phases of an activity are or may be shared;
while inclusive competence, either organized or unorganized, means
shared effective authority to participate in decisions. Similarly, exclusive interests may be broken down into exclusive uses and exclusive competences. Exclusive interests in use pertain uniquely to
one participant in the world community. Exclusive interests in competence exist when the general community's constitutive process allocates authority to a state to act unilaterally, with a minimum of review by others.
Additional complications are inherent in the particular questions
posed because of the exclusivity of competence jointly claimed by the
United States and Panama as against the world community. While
maintaining a united front against inclusive interests (such as proposals for internationalization of the Canal), each of the two nationstates has made conflicting claims involving both exclusive uses and
exclusive competences.
By now it should be evident that the problem in the past has
been more than one of simply interpreting particular clauses of the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, though this task is by no means to be
taken lightly. But our attention is also required to the intermediate
and long-range aspects of the problem as well as to the short-range
aspects. Practically speaking, this observation is buttressed by agreement on all sides that a new canal must be in operation by 1980; 3
such an undertaking implies new and perhaps radically different arrangements from those now existing.
Certainly no intelligent analysis of the problem of accommodating
inclusive and exclusive interests can be made without placing the
problem in its proper context. In an attempt to answer the questions
posed, then, our goal should be one of interpreting the Hay-BunauVarilla Treaty and related treaties, past, present, and future, in terms
of an accommodation of interests, continually referring to the whole
of the social context.
3. In addition to the needs expressed in President Johnson's statements of
September 24, 1965 (see APPENDIX), and December 19, 1964 (N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,
1964, p. 1, col. 8) see Stratton, Sea-Level Canal: How and Where, 43 FOREIGN
AFFAiRs 512, 513 (1965); The Atlantic Monthly, May 1965, p. 28.
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THE CONTEXT AND PROCESS OF INTERACTION

The status of the various Panama Canal treaties and the position
of the United States in the Panama Canal Zone can be understood
only in the larger context of the entire world social process since the
enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine 4 in 1823. This context must include all the participants of the world social process, their perspectives, the sustaining patterns of institutional practice in communication and collaboration, and the features of the resource environment.
The relevance of such an inquiry may easily be seen. The comprehensive world social process has shaped the predispositions of particular agreement-makers. It has contributed the environment which
has expanded the effective capabilities of both the United States and
Panama in strategies of persuasion. It has affected not only demands
for commitment (including freedom or compulsion in choice) and
capabilities for fulfillment, but also the modalities by which the
parties have mediated their subjectivities and the degree of their
common perception and understanding5
United States policy in the Mexican Gulf and the Caribbean has
been characterized by pursuit of one over-riding value: Power. A
typical expression of this goal may be found in President Hayes' advice to the Senate more than three decades before the Canal was completed: "[I]ts relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our
means of defense, our unity, peace and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States.",; This objective
has been justified in the name of "national interests" and "national
security." At various times less important goals have influenced our
policy, but the exclusion of other first-rate powers in the Caribbean
has been the keynote of the course pursued by the United States
during the past one hundred and forty years.
This basic proposition, as first articulated by President Monroe,
was that no European nation would be suffered to impose its sovereignty or system of government on any former colony in this hemisphere that had won its independence. The Monroe Doctrine ex4. The "Monroe Doctrine," so-called because of its enunciation in President
Monroe's message at the commencement of the First Session of the 18th Congress,
December 2, 1823, finds its classic exposition in: TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND

PEACE 1-39

(1914). For a recent and lucid discussion of the doctrine and its

status see: Rovere, Letter From Washington, The New Yorker, Oct. 6, 1962, pp.

148-57. See also the discussion by Reston and Sulzberger of the "Johnson Doctrine"
as a corollary to the "Monroe Doctrine," N.Y. Times, May 5, 1965, p. 46, col. 5.
5. McDougal, Lasswell & Miller, The Interpretation of International Agreements: Principles of Content and Procedure in Process at 18 (unpublished article

in Yale Law School Library, to be published in 1966 under the title
TERPRETATION OF ACREEMENTS AND

6.

10

CONG. REC.

WORLD

THE IN-

PUBLIC ORDER).

1399 (1880).
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cluded existing European colonies from its scope, but was positive in
its declaration that henceforth the continents of the Western Hemisphere were not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by
European powers. In the course of the nineteenth century the Doctrine was enlarged to include in its restriction all nations outside
this hemisphere as well as any efforts by these nations to transfer to
another its existing sovereignty or dominion in a territory of the
Americas.
Despite such strong talk, the United States remained a relatively
weak power, and the remainder of the nineteenth century brought
concessions and treaties which gave the United States valuable time
for securing its power position in the Caribbean.
Annexation of the Far Southwest and the Pacific Coast led the
United States, more than a decade before the outbreak of the Civil
War, to pursue a policy of safeguarding the Isthmian routes, a policy
made more urgent with the discovery of gold in California. The
Government at Washington interested itself in Panama, Nicaragua,
and Tehuantepec. Under these circumstances the United States and
New Granada (presently Colombia), on December 12, 1846, signed
a treaty that was to have a far-reaching influence in the Isthmus and
which finally provided the legal excuse for the action of the Washington Government in securing Panamanian independence in 1903.
7
Article 35 of that convention stated:
[T]he United States guaranty, positively and efficaciously, to
New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality
of the beforementioned isthmus, with the view that the free
transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or
embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and,
in consequence, the United States also guaranty, in the same
manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New
Granada has and possesses over the said territory.
At this point, however, the United States confronted England and,
to a lesser extent, France, both of whom objected to her domination of
the Gulf and Caribbean. English opposition was so effective that
Secretary of State John M. Clayton and the British minister, Sir
Henry Lytton Bulwer, signed, on April 19, 1850, a treaty by which
their governments obligated themselves not to obtain exclusive control
over any ship canal in any part of Central America. They further
promised never to fortify, to occupy, to colonize, or to assume dominion over any part of Central America in connection with a canal
7. A General Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce With the
Republic of New Granada, Dec. 12, 1846, art. XXXV, para. 1, 9 Stat. 881, 898-99,
T.S. No. 54.
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enterprise. 8 The practical result was an understanding that any canal
joining the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean should be controlled
jointly by the United States and Great Britain. This British opposition was not resolved in favor of the United States until the signing
of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901.
After decades of discussion an attempt to cut a canal across the
Isthmus was finally begun in 1879 under the auspices of Ferdinand de
Lesseps. Work was carried on for several years, and French savings
were wasted by the hundreds of millions until operations were suspended in 1888. The canal company went into the hands of the receiver on February 4, 1889, and the New Panama Canal Company,
headed by Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was active without appreciable
success from 1894 until 1899. 9
During the Spanish-American War the need for a waterway across
the Isthmus was strikingly demonstrated by the voyage of the Oregon,
steaming at flank speed from Puget Sound to Cuban waters by way
of the Magellan Straits, a distance three times that it would have been
had the Canal been built. This exploit, coupled with the conquest of
the Philippines, bringing new American responsibilities in the Pacific
far from the center of power on the Atlantic seaboard, awakened
anew the interest of the United States in a canal route.
On March 30, 1899, Congress authorized an investigation of the
probable canal routes, and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of November
18, 1901, gave the United States the right to construct a waterway
across Central America without British interference. 10 This treaty
was the result of negotiations that led to the proclamation of a condition of neutrality in accordance with the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 for the Suez Canal, a condition incorporated by reference into the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. Thus was the canal power
struggle between the United States and the Western European powers
finally resolved.
After a bitter fight the proponents of the Panamanian route, aided
by Bunau-Varilla of the New Panama Canal Company, were successful over those who favored Nicaragua. On June 29, 1902, President
Theodore Roosevelt signed the Spooner Bill, which provided for a
canal through Panama. The French offer to sell their concession had
been accepted by the Washington Government. The State Department
then proceeded to negotiate with Colombia for the canal with the result that the Hay-Herran Treaty was signed by the United States on
January 22, 1903. The United States was granted a one-hundred-year
8. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Diplomatic History of the Panama
Canal, S. Doc. No. 474, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1914).
9. BUNAU-VARILLA, PANAMA 28-154 (1920).
10. Id. at 292.
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lease on a zone of land ten kilometers wide across the Isthmus for an
initial payment of $10 million and an annuity of 250,000 dollars to
begin nine years after the ratification of the treaty.' 1
The Bogotai Government, privately hoping for greater concessions,
rejected the treaty on August 12, 1903. This action fanned the flames
of revolution, which had long smouldered in Panama. At this juncture Bunau-Varilla, whose perspectives must always be considered in
light of his financial interest in the sale of the New Panama Canal
Company's concession, arrived on the scene in Washington. Through
a combination of chance meetings and adroitly arranged interviews
with President Roosevelt and other highly placed officials, he learned
that the United States was still interested in the Panamanian route
and would not be averse to a Panamanian revolution. 12 In his search
for a means of inaugurating a rebellion without the financial aid of
the United States and without an express promise of its military cooperation, he decided that the United States might supply the vessels
required to prevent Colombian troops from being landed on the
Isthmus under the guise of carrying out the provisions of article 35
3
of the treaty of 1846.1
Bunau-Varilla, after extracting a promise from the Panamanian
leader, Amador, that he would be appointed minister to the United
States to negotiate the treaty by which the prospective Panamanian
Republic would grant the route of the proposed canal, disclosed his
plans to Amador and used his Washington contacts to have the revolution carried through in accordance with his plans. Bunau-Varilla
characterized his planning and direction of the revolution as a "struggle . . . for the defence and triumph of the greatest moral interest
which the French genius has ever had abroad."' 4
On November 6, three days after the revolution began, the United
States recognized the insurgent government as the de facto government
of Panama. On November 13, de jure recognition was granted, and
Bunau-Varilla was received officially in Washington as the minister of
the Republic of Panama. 15
Thus began the work of the new Panamanian minister, by nationality a Frenchman and, in his own words, a man who considered he
"had the moral right to annul, by political action at Panama, the
fatal effect which political action at BogotA was bound to have on
the gigantic French interests of which I was the sole defender."16
11. Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal,supra note 8, at 277-88.
12. BUNAu-VARuLA, PANAMA 294-97 (1920).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 314.
Id. at v.
Id. at 364-66.
Id. at 303.
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Knowing that a commission was being sent from Panama to aid him
in negotiating a treaty, Bunau-Varilla persuaded Secretary of State
Hay of the necessity of haste if the United States was to get all the
concessions it desired - concessions that would readily be forthcoming
as long as Hay had only Bunau-Varilla with whom to deal."
Under such circumstances Hay and Bunau-Varilla proceeded to
draw up a treaty giving the United States the right to construct a
canal across the Isthmus. The Frenchman drafted the convention and
Hay hastened to accept it with only minor changes. It was signed at
6:40 in the evening of November 18, 1903, in Hay's drawing room.
Two hours later the Panamanian Mission arrived in Washington to
help negotiate the treaty. 18
The Panamanian Mission, faced with a fait accompli, refused to
ratify the treaty; they insisted it must be sent to Panama for ratification. Bunau-Varilla resolved to obtain the ratification from the government itself, before the arrival of the treaty at Panama. His first
dispatches to this effect were answered negatively. On November 25
he sent a cablegram threatening the Panamanian Government with
the acute displeasure of Secretary Hay and the impending arrival
of a Colombian envoy seeking a reversal of the position of the United
States with promises of new concessions. Bunau-Varilla ended his
cablegram with an ultimatum that he would resign if the treaty was
not immediately ratified.-8 This blunt threat brought the desired
notification of promise of ratification of a treaty which had not yet
been seen.
The provisions of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of November 18,
1903, were summarized as follows by President Roosevelt in his mes2
sage to Congress on December 7, 1903: 0
By the provisions of the treaty the United States guarantees
and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. There is granted to the United States in perpetuity the
use, occupation, and control of a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles into the sea at either terminal,
with all lands lying outside of the zone necessary for the
construction of the canal or for its auxiliary works, and with
the islands in the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and
Colon are not embraced in the canal zone, but the United
States assumes their sanitation and, in case of need, the maintenance of order therein; the United States enjoys within the
17. Id. at 367, 374.
18.

Id. at 377.

19. Id. at 383-85.
20. Message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the opening session of
Congress, December 7, 1903, in H.R. Doc. No. 1, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1903).
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granted limits all the rights, power, and authority which it
would possess were it the sovereign of the territory to the exclusion of the exercise of sovereign rights by the Republic.
All railway and canal property rights belonging to Panama and
needed for the canal to pass to the United States, including
any property of the respective companies in the cities of Panama
or Colon; the works, property, and personnel of the canal and
railways are exempted from taxation as well in the cities of
Panama and Colon as in the Canal Zone and its dependencies.
Free immigration of the personnel and importation of supplies
for the construction and operation of the canal are granted.
Provision is made for the use of military force and the building
of fortifications by the United States for the protection of transit. In other details, particularly as to the acquisition of the interests of the New Panama Canal Company and the Panama
Railway by the United States and the condemnation of private
property for the uses of the canal, the stipulations of the HayHerran treaty are closely followed, while compensation to be
given for these enlarged grants remains the same, being ten
millions of dollars payable on exchange of ratifications; and, beginning nine years from that date, an annual payment of
$250,000 during the life of the convention.
Thus the destitute little Republic of Panama, with an area of
about 80,000 square miles and a population of less than half a
million, became a participant in the process of agreement with the
most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere. The process was
inevitably affected by the low degree of governmentalization of the
internal social processes as well as the lack of any resource base
except its geographic position athwart one of the world's great highways of transportation. There was a complete lack of industrialization
and the new republic received no help from states other than the
United States in its revolution and later in its treaty negotiations. It
must be noted that the basic situation is little changed today. The
population is now estimated by the United Nations at a little over a
million, but basically the population is still dependent economically
upon the natural resource inherent in its geographical position, a
resource controlled by a powerful United States.
The role of the particular individuals cannot be overemphasized
here. Whenever states make agreements, the subjectivities which are
important to shared commitment, and which a subsequent interpreter
must seek, are the subjectivities of individual human beings, the
authoritative and controlling negotiators. 2' In this particular in21.

McDougal, Lasswell & Miller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 10.
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stance the role of Bunau-Varilla was affected by certain specific characteristics, such as his formal authority (both as minister of the Republic of Panama and the director of the New Panama Canal Company), his skill and intelligence, as well as more general conditioning
factors, such as his intense primary loyalty to France and French
financial interests.
The general objectives of both parties in making the Hay-BunauVarilla Treaty have not changed with the passage of years. The
United States still proclaims the Canal's chief value is as a safeguard
to its power position in the Caribbean. Some emphasis is still placed
upon the desire to promote commerce and investments and there is
perhaps a desire, evidenced by various projects of the Alliance for
Progress, to help the people of the area along the road to progress.
Panama, while demanding recognition of her sovereignty in the Canal Zone, nevertheless has seemed more interested in the economic
benefits to be derived from her most valuable resource. She is left
with the freedom to pursue this objective more single-mindedly since
the very serious health problems of her peoples were alleviated early
in the history of the Canal. The intensities with which Panama has
affirmed her demands concerning sovereignty have reflected the necessity and utility of nationalistic demands as a domestic political
device, a device used increasingly throughout the world.
Normally the outcome phase in the making of a treaty is the
moment, after past differences have been reconciled and before future
differences arise, when the parties integrate and express their shared
expectations of common commitment to a future policy.22 This phase
was never satisfactorily resolved in the history of the Hay-BunauVarilla Treaty, and here lies the key to decades of dispute over proper
interpretation of the agreement. Although it was signed by representatives of both governments, it is apparent from his memoirs that the
perspectives of Bunau-Varilla, the drafter as well as Panama's signer,
were not those of Panama. Furthermore, the promise of ratification
was extracted from the Panamanians before they had read the treaty.
It is true that the Government of Panama subsequently acknowledged
the irreversibility of its commitment but this must be attributed to
the diplomatic, economic, and military strategies coercively employed
by the United States. The importance of differences in power position between the two nations is a matter easily observed. Scarcely
less important were differences in capabilities for the production of
goods, scientific development and intelligence services, the capacities
of statesmen and negotiators (with the exception of Bunau-Varilla),
solidarity in the community, and loyalty of allies.

22.

Id. at 16.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

9

1965]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 2
THE PANAMA

CANAL TREATIES

The United States has suffered from a guilty conscience ever since
the treaty was negotiated. Secretary Hay's view of the treaty was
expressed in a letter to Senator Spooner February 20, 1904, describing
it as "fully advantageous to the United States, and, we must confess,
not so advantageous to Panama .... You and I know very well how
many points are in the treaty to which any patriotic Panamanian
would object." 23 Such feelings have persisted and through the years
24
have resulted in numerous concessions by the United States.
That lack of consensus about the content of their commitment has
existed since the treaty's inception is evidenced by the demands which
were immediately forthcoming from Panama and which have continued until the present time. These demands have led to lengthy
negotiations which, from time to time, have resulted in revisions of
the treaty. As a result of the 1936 revision the United States withdrew its guarantee of independence, raised the annual payments to
430,000 dollars a year, and agreed to bar all commercial enterprise
25
within the Zone except that directly concerned with shipping.
A second revision of the treaty was signed and ratified in 1955.26
Principal among concessions made by the United States was an increase in the annuity from 430,000 dollars to $1.93 million yearly.
In addition, the United States gave Panama about $24 million worth
of real estate and buildings no longer needed by the Canal Zone administration. United States citizen and noncitizen employees were
guaranteed equality of pay and opportunity. The United States also
agreed to build a high-level bridge over the Pacific entrance to the
Canal. Under the treaty revision Panama is enabled to levy income
taxes on Panamanian citizens and those of third countries employed
by Canal Zone agencies; United States citizens and members of the
armed forces are exempt.
Since that time varied demands, heightened by the Egyptian
seizure of the Suez Canal, have been made. Following a series of
riots and incidents in the fall of 1958, President Eisenhower issued
an order that the Panamanian flag be flown alongside that of the
27
United States in the Canal Zone.

23.

ArARo, MEDIO SIGLO DE RELACIONES ENT=E PANAMA

Y LOS EsTADos UNIOS

22 (1959).
24. Fenwick, The Treaty of 1955 Between the United States and Panama, 49
AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 546 (1955).
25. General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation With Panama, March 2,
1936, 53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945.
26. Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation With the Republic of
Panama, January 25, 1955, 2 U.S.T. & O.I1A. 2273, T.IA.S. No. 3297, 243 U.N.T.S.
211.
27 N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1959, p. 13, col. 1.
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By unanimous vote on November 16, 1961, the Panamanian
National Assembly called for a scrapping of its existing treaty with
the United States regarding the Canal Zone. 28 On November 17, 1961,
Secretary of State Rusk promised discussions concerning a new treaty
"early in 1962."29 Discussions between President Kennedy and President Chiari did take place in Washington in June 1962. The two
presidents found "a basis for solution," at least on paper, to many
emotional problems, among them the flying of Panamanian flags in
the Canal Zone; the encouragement of greater Panamanian sales to
the Canal Zone; equal labor opportunities and wages for Panamanians
employed by the canal company, and the withholding by the United
States of income taxes of non-American workers on behalf of Panama.30 Notably missing, however, was any mention of a new treaty,
though the two leaders did agree that the matter of increased payments would be considered by high level representatives of both governments. Ambassador Farland and Canal Zone Governor Fleming
decided, in implementation of Presidents Kennedy and Chiari's agreement that both the Panamanian and United States flags would be
flown at "appropriate" places, that the best way to satisfy the obligation at schools within the Zone would be to fly no flags there at all.31
Thus the American flag at Balboa High School was taken down during
the 1963 Christmas vacation. When the United States students returned and found no flag flying, they themselves raised the United
States flag on the school flagpole. Soon thereafter a group of Panamanian high school students attempted to raise the Panamanian flag
on the same pole; they were turned away by the Zone police, and
soon full scale riots erupted between Panamanians and Zonians.
During the course of the next four days the casualty list numbered
more than twenty dead, hundreds injured, and property damage in
the millions. As an aftermath Panama severed diplomatic relations
with the United States and filed charges of aggression against the
United States with the United Nations Security Council. During the
three months that followed, the Inter-American Peace Committee of
the Organization of American States sought to restore normal relations
between the two countries. The two countries remained stalemated,
however, over the vital point whether a firm advance commitment
should be made for the writing of a new Panama Canal treaty. Finally,
on April 3, 1964, an accord was reached which resulted in resumption
28.

N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1961, p. 9, col. 2.

29. 45 DEP'T STATE

BULL.

918, 925 (1961).

30. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1963, p. 52, col. 1.
31. Statement by Mr. Califano, Counsel for the United States, at 1964 Hearings
in Panama Before O.A.S. and International Commission of Jurists, THE SIx-rH
HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM, THE PANAMA CANAL 51 (1965).
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of diplomatic relations.32 Even so, the accord studiously avoided the
use of the terms "discussions" and "negotiations."' 3
Against this background special representatives of both governments began meeting in Washington soon after President Robles took
office in October. Panamanians insisted the meetings in Washington
were not for the purpose of "discussing," but rather to- "negotiate."
And negotiations, to most Panamanians, meant a new treaty. It was
at this point, in December of 1964, amid reports of lack of progress
in the November meetings, that President Johnson made his surprise
announcement that the United States would "plan in earnest" to
replace the Panama Canal with a sea-level channel linking the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. 34 Simultaneously he announced his decision to
negotiate a new treaty with Panama on the existing canal. Several
months later, on September 24, 1965, in a televised press conference
called for the purpose, President Johnson spoke of the progress made
and of the areas of agreement reached thus far. (The text of President
Johnson's speech appears in the APPENDIX.) Foremost among these
areas is an agreement to abrogate the 1903 treaty. Significantly, perhaps, he spoke almost in the same breath of concurrent negotiations
which might lead to construction of the new canal in Panama. The
implications of the coupling of the two earlier announcements, the
two later announcements, and the course of the negotiations during
the intervening months will be examined in detail in a later portion
of this article.
Returning now to a consideration, in inverse order, of the questions originally posed:
(1) Why has the world community made no move toward internationalizing the Panama Canal, thus assuring the most inclusive possible use of such a vital waterway?
(2) Why has Panama taken no unilateral action to terminate
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903?
(3) Why is the United States negotiating a new treaty if it is
under no legal compulsion to so do?

32. For the best resumd of events leading to and subsequent to the January
1964 riots see Reports on the Events in Panama, Jan. 9-12, 1964, prepared by the

Investigating Committee appointed by the International Commission of Jurists,
Geneva, Switzerland.
33.

Previous talks and a proposed accord had broken down over the in-

terpretation of the Spanish word "negociar." The United States insisted it should
be interpreted as "discuss" while Panama was equally insistent that it meant
"negotiate."

Baxter & Carroll, Working Paper: The Panama Canal, in Tm
SIXTH HAMMARsKJ6LD FORUM, THE PANAMA CANAL 4-6 (1965). See also Geyelin,

The Irksome Panama Wrangle, The Reporter, April 9, 1964, pp. 14-17.
34. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 8.
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There is, of course, an easy way with such questions. The United
States is strong - the Republic of Panama is weak. An infinite number of variations may be played on such a theme, but the easy way is
no way at all for the scholar intent upon a policy-oriented analysis
of a given problem. It is with the intention of illuminating the background against which new treaty arrangements are assuming shape
that these questions are posed and discussed.
INTERNATIONALIZATION

The policies at stake in internationalization of the present Panama
Canal (or a proposed sea level trans-isthmian canal, whether or not
it transits Panama) are those of balancing the exclusive interests
and competences now claimed and exercised by the United States and
Panama with the world community's inclusive interests in a waterway
which serves all maritime powers directly and all others indirectly.
President Truman recommended to the Potsdam Conference that
the Panama and Suez Canals and other waterways vital to maritime
commerce be placed under the United Nations. 35 His recommendation
went unheeded, and since then exclusive interests have rapidly prevailed over inclusive interests: the Danube is Communist controlled
and the Suez Canal is controlled by the intensely nationalistic United
Arab Republic.
Ideally, internationalization of the Panama Canal would entail a
bilateral termination of any existing treaty between the United
States and Panama, followed by negotiations satisfactory to both
nations which would result in internationalization. The situation is,
in fact, not so simple. Panama has repeatedly denounced internationalization.36 Inquiry as to Panama's vehement stand evokes varied
responses, ranging from the Panamanian's "derogation of sovereignty"
cry to Yankee insistence that Panama is fearful only of losing the
bargaining power derived from pitting the claims of nationalism
against the United States.3 7 The United States is in official agreement
with Panama in rejecting internationalism. Both the Eisenhower and
35. TRUMAN, YEAR OF DECISION 377 (1955).
Truman, August 9, 1945, 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.

See also radio address of President

208, 212 (1945). President Truman's

recollection of just what he said was called into question by Secretary of State
Dulles on August 28, 1956, in The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22,
1956, 6392 DEP'T STATE BULL. 295, 298 (1956).
36. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1961, p. 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1956, p. 4,
col. 5. A recent and notable exception, perhaps attributable to the heat of the
moment, was Panamanian U.N. Representative Aquilino Boyd's demand in the
U.N. that the Canal Zone either be handed back to Panama or internationalized
with special privileges for Panama. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, p. 24, col. 8.
37. Travis & Watkins, Control of the Panama Canal: An Obsolete Shibboleth?,
37 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 407, 418 (1959).
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Kennedy administrations have been on record as opposing such a
step, 38 and it can be inferred that the Johnson administration is
similarly disinclined toward such a step in view of recent pronouncements on the negotiations in progress. 39
Despite the positions stated by the United States and Panama, it
is entirely possible that at some future time the world community may
claim that its broad interests lie in internationalizing the Canal in
order to stabilize maritime expectations. 40 The most frequent claims
heard today involve tolls and are usually pressed by private associations or individual users,4 ' but other users' claims have arisen in connection with rights of passage both in wartime and peacetime. More
specialized claims have been presented with respect to alleged discriminatory action during peacetime against the users of certain na42
tion-states.
It has been suggested that the United Nations or the Organization
of American States are appropriate groups to operate such an internationalized Canal. 43 Although such suggestions have usually been
premised on control conditioned upon new treaty arrangements satisfactory to both nations and pursuant to the bilateral termination of
the original treaty, claims may well be made that these groups should
take the initiative in "freeing" the Canal Zone should either Panama
or the United States prove excessively recalcitrant.
Such a policy would, of course, necessitate use of strategies of
coercion rather than strategies of persuasion. Nevertheless, coercion
of the world community of users by the parties to the treaty would
at some point justify community-wide coercion if such action would
reduce the incidence of coercion in the whole context.
Aside from the present power position of the United States and
its status in the Organization of American States, it is difficult to
envision such action by the Latin American members of the OAS.
For over a century their greatest fear has been that of intervention,
and the provision of the OAS charter forbidding intervention in the
external or internal affairs of a sister state is far more sacred than
that calling for joint solidarity in the face of enemy attack.44 This
BENTON, THE VoicE OF LATIN AMumicA 153 (1961).
39. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, p. l-E, col. 1.
40. See Fenwick, Legal Aspects of the Panama Case, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 436,
440-41 (1964) for suggestion that the canal is already an "international public
utility" and raising the question whether the treaty has not long since lost in
part its bilateral character and become an obligation to all the world.

38.

41.

Fenwick, The Treaty of 1955 Between the United States and Panama, 49

AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 544 (1955).
42. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1962, p. 51, col. 4.
43. Travis &.Watkins, supra note 37, at 417.
44.

Durling, La Intervencidn de los Estados Unidos en los asuntos internos de
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assertion is borne out by an examination of the various agreements
entered into since the Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Treaty and by
the bitterness of the San Jose Conference in 1960, the second Punta
del Este Conference in 1962, 4 5 and the aftermath of the United
States' involvement in the Dominican Republic during recent
months.

46

As for the United Nations, the organization's past action indicates
it would do no more than intervene to keep the peace in areas where
uncontrolled violence has already arisen, such as Korea, the Congo,
and the Suez. The United Nations would probably be as reluctant
as the OAS to attempt termination of the agreement, though not
necessarily for the same reasons. The chief inhibiting factor against
United Nations action is the bipolarity of power within the organization. With both the United States and Russia exercising the veto
power in the Security Council, little could be accomplished there.
Furthermore, Russia would not lightly shake the balance of power
by endorsing a type of action which might in turn be used against
the Communist bloc. General Assembly action, in addition to the
latter consideration, would probably reflect the fear of the small "uncommitted" nations of coercions suffered as recent colonies and the
large Latin American bloc's aversion to intervention in any form.
(These observations are predicated on the continuance of a bipolar
power distribution, however, and would not necessarily hold true
should the distribution become unipolar or, perhaps, triangular.)
Even among those in the United States who advocate internationalization, considerable controversy exists as to the proper control
organization. 4 7 Advocates of control under the OAS argue that the
Panama, 3 UNIVERSIDAD DE PANAMA ANUARIO DE DERECHO 165 (1958); N.Y. Times,

Jan. 12, 1964, p. 4-E, col. I; N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1961, p. 3-E, col. I.
45. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1962, p. 1, col. 4, at 8, col. 3.
46. Particularly galling was the September 20, 1965, resolution passed by the
United States House of Representatives asserting the right of unilateral intervention
if necessary to prevent a Communist takeover in the hemisphere. For reaction in
Latin America generally and Panama in particular, see La Estrella de Panama,
Oct. 5, 1965, p. 1, col. 2; La Estrella de Panama, Oct. 1, 1965, p. 21, col. I.
For adverse United States reaction, see Editorial, Cause and Latin Effect, Miami
Herald, Sept. 25, p. 6-A, col. 1.
47. See Senator Dirksen's criticism of Senator Fulbright's recent suggestion
that an international consortium including the United States and Russia among
others cooperate in building a new canal. Fulbright said the same idea could be
applied to revised operation of the present canal. Miami Herald, March 7, 1965,
p. 1, col. 1. Senator Aiken, upon his return in 1960 from a Panamanian junket,
proposed internationalization of the canal under auspices of either the United
Nations or the O.A.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS Comm., 86TH CONG., 2D SESS.
REPORT ON

LATIN AMERICA,

VENEZUELA,

BRAZIL,

PERU,

BOLIVIA,

AND

PANAMA

15

(Comm. Print 1960).
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Canal is no longer vital to the security of the United States;48 that
the economic interests of the United States would be protected by
internationalization; and that hemispheric internationalization would
provide important dividends in the ideological controversy. 49 It has
even been suggested that the Canal Zone could provide a home for
the OAS, if the OAS wanted it as a home, thus softening the criticism
that the organization is in part controlled by Washington purely
because of its physical location.50 Suggestions have also been made
that a canal so controlled could (through its toll revenue) help support the OAS and its projects. 51
Advocates of control under the United Nations charge, however,
that such an operation is subject to the same objections which have
been made against a Danube Commission made up only of riparian
52
powers. It has been said:
Internationalization under the United Nations would leave unimpaired the real interests of the United States, namely, the
preservation of the Canal and access to it, good service at low
cost, and a voice in the operation of the Canal. The security
of the Canal would be, if anything, enhanced. Already hopelessly vulnerable, an internationalized Canal might seem to a
potential aggressor a less attractive target than one under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
In any case, the United States would be entitled to come to
th6 defense of the Canal, if defense were feasible, by acting
within the United Nations under Article 51 of the Charter or
the "uniting for peace" procedures. Such action in defense of
an international agency would enjoy moral and practical sup48. Travis & Watkins, supra note 37, at 417. See also Travis & Watkins, The
Time Bomb Explodes, The Nation, Jan. 27, 1964, pp. 83-85. But see Baldwin,
Panama Canal's Value, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1964, p. 14, col. 7.
49. BENTON, THE VOICE OF LATIN AMERICA 154 (1961); Kantor, United States Latin American Relations: Impact of the Kennedy Administration, in 28 VITAL
SPrmcHzs OF THE DAY, 142-46 (Dec. 1961).
50. BENTON, THE VOICE OF LATIN AMmucA 153-54 (1961). It should be noted
that control under the O.A.S. would effectuate one of the chief aims of the
Peruvian Aprista Movement. The program as set forth by Haya de la Torre on
May 7, 1924, called for the internationalization of the Panama Canal. On May 30,
1924, it was changed to call for "Interamericanizacidndel Canal de Panama." La
Estrella de Panama, Oct. 5, 1965, p. 4, col. 2. See also Kantor, The Ideology and
Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement. U. of Cal. Publications in Political
Science, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 27 (1953); Kantor, United States-Latin American Relations: Impact of the Kennedy Administration, in 28 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
142-46 (Dec. 1961).
51.

"BENTON, THE VOICE OF LATIN AMERICA 154 (1961).

52.

Travis & Watkins, Control of the Panama Canal: An Obsolete Shibboleth?,

37 FoREIGN AFFARs 407, 417 (1959).
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port which the defense of an exclusive interest claimed by the
United States could not evoke.
Regardless of the controlling device, advocates of internationalization generally agree that the United States could expect good service
at reasonable cost from an international agency and that the genuine
interests of the United States would be enhanced by such an arrangement.
One must face facts, however, and the fact is, as previously mentioned, that both the United States and Panama oppose internationalization. Unless these states reverse their present positions,
an action which appears improbable on the part of the United States
and even more improbable on the part of Panama, internationalization can be accomplished only by community-wide coercion of the
two nations.
There is little in the trend of decisions to indicate that internationalization will occur, except, perhaps, for the somewhat dubious
example of the international accords reached on Antarctica. And in
Antarctica, of course, the world community was confronted with an
uninhabited area of relatively low use. Nevertheless, the required
impetus for internationalization might be provided by Panamanian
nationalization of the present Canal or attempted nationalization of
the projected new canal, whether by Panama or some other Central
American riparian power.
In such an event it would be relevant to consider the arguments
advanced on the subject when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal.
Generally, exponents of internationalization argued that the Suez
Canal was a unique international public utility of vital concern to
the world community and therefore beyond any single state's jurisdiction to nationalize.53 More specifically, it was argued that the
Suez Canal Company acquired an international status by virtue of
the 1888 Convention of Constantinople and by other factors such as
the international composition of the company's shareholders. 54 These
latter factors would have little relevance in the Panamanian situation,
but the argument based upon the 1888 Convention has considerable
relevance. That convention states the desire of the contracting parties to establish a canal system designed to "guarantee at all times,
55
and for all the powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal."
This same concept was expressly written into the Hay-Pauncefote
53. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. llth year, 735th meeting 3-24 (S/PV.735)
(1956).
54. Ibid.
55. Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the
Field of International Law-Survey and Comment 11, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 126,
128 (1957).
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Treaty concluded by the United States and Great Britain in 1901.56
Then the United States incorporated section 1 of article III of the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty by express reference in article XVIII of the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.57 Thus, a much stronger argument could
be made as to the international status of the Panama Canal than was
made for such status in the case of the Suez, for the 1888 Convention
was not considered incorporated into the Suez concession agreements.
In the case of Panama, not only is there express incorporation by
reference; but the status derives from the same instrument which set
up the Canal and that instrument is a treaty rather than a concession
agreement. Presumably the still valid Hay-Pauncefote Treaty would
dictate the inclusion of a similar provision in any treaty providing
for a new canal, thus laying the basis for a similar argument with
58
respect to such a canal.
Although the arguments invcQving status under the 1888 Convention of Constantinople were not considered persuasive enough to
determine the international status of the Suez Canal, such arguments,
augmented by the additional factors mentioned, might prevail in the
Panamanian or some similar situation. At any rate, such an argument
could be seized upon if the world community felt the necessity of
legally justifying community-wide coercion resulting in internationalization. In summation, despite the arguable merits of internationalization, there is little reason to predict such a course given the past
trends and the present situation in Latin America.
NATIONALIZATION

Although individual Panamanian claimants-5 have in recent years
loudly demanded unilateral termination of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty, frequently as a vote-getting device exploiting rampant na-

56. See Article III, Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal, S. Doc. No. 474, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 293 (1914).
57. Id. at S01.
58. But see Taylor, The Panama Canal: The Rule of Treaty Construction
Known as Rebus Sic Stantibus, 1 GEo. L.J. 193, 197 (1913).
59. The foremost example is former National Assemblywoman Thelma King,
an outspoken anti-American Panama City attorney and columnist specializing in
foreign affairs. She played an active role in the anti-American rioting of January
1964, inciting the demonstrators with her radio broadcasts and her daily column
in La Hora (Panama). See King, Panama Debe Denunciar La Nulidad de la
Convencidn de 1903 y Concertar un Nuevo Tratado, 4 UNIVERsMAD DE PANAMA
ANUARO DE DEmcHo 277 (1959-1960). See also as a representative column by King,
Han Llegado Dos Negociadores Norteamericanos, La Hora (Panama), June 2,
1965, p. 13, col. 7.
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tionalism,6 0 official demands have thus far called for bilateral termination incidental to negotiations for a new treaty. 61 These official demands would seem to have been met by President Johnson's recently
announced decision to abrogate the 1903 Treaty and to draft a new
one offering Panama a share in management and profits of the waterway and "effectively recognizing Panama's sovereignty over the area
of the present Canal Zone." 62 As nationalistic pressures further intensify, however, unilateral termination of the proposed new treaty
may be considered by Panamanian authorities. Such action might well
be triggered by a United States decision to build a sea-level canal
through some country other than Panama, though both politics and
economics seem to favor a Panamanian route. 63 Thus, both from the
standpoint of future outcomes and past history, a study of the past
trend of decision in this area has relevance.
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty itself made no provision for termination or for revision; and a study of the history of its drafting,
coupled with the use of the words granting sovereignty "in perpetuity" would seem to have negated such intentions on the part of
either party. Thus the problem, from the standpoint of community
perspectives, became one of maintaining an appropriate balance between the honoring of the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
treaty (that is, maintaining a reasonable stability in the relations between the two nation-state participants in the world power process)
and permitting or encouraging a continual, progressive reformulation
of policies to keep them in accord with the changing perspectives and
conditions of the parties.64
In more traditional terms the problem might be considered as a
need to balance the doctrines of pacta sunt servanda65 and rebus sic
stantibus.66 The former doctrine, whether regarded as a principle of
60. N.Y. Times, March 15, 1964, p. 28, col. I; N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1964, p. l-E,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1964, p. I-E, col. 1.
61. See President Chiari's letter to President Kennedy and the Panamanian
National Assembly's supporting resolution in Documentos, 5 UNIVERSIDAD DE
PANAMA ANUARIO DE DERECHo 252-55 (1962). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964,
p. 25, col. 4; Panama Tribune, May 29, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.
62. See APPENDIX.
63. Stratton, Sea-Level Canal: How and Where, 43 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 512, 515-16
(1965). See also Natanson, Only Panama Really Wants To Have a Canal, Miami
Herald, Feb. 7, 1965, p. 5-H, col. I.
64. In this formulation I have drawn upon the teaching materials, The
Public Order of the World Community at 338, prepared by Professors McDougal,
Lasswell, and Burke and on file in the Yale Law Library. See also Kunz, The Law
of Nations, Static and Dynamic, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 630, 634-35 (1933); McDougal
& Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 338-41 (1945).
65. Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775 (1959).
66. BRICS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 917 (2d ed. 1952); Garner, Revision of Trea-
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international law or a pre-juridical postulate, tells us that agreements
between nations, like those between individuals, are to be performed.
The latter doctrine, a definition upon which the majority of writers
cannot agree, might nevertheless be described as a tacit condition,
said to attach to all treaties, that they shall cease to be obligatory as
soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which they were
founded has substantially changed. 67 This conflict of doctrines has
concerned men as early as Aquinas, who on principle demanded that
contracts be performed even with regard to enemies, but said also
that, if the circumstances existing in reference to persons or objects
at the time of making the contract had changed, nonperformance of
the contract was excusable.68 Seventeenth and eighteenth century
followers of Grotius, such as Pufendorf and Vattel, were unanimously
in favor of the sanctity of contracts. Opponents of the sanctity of
contracts on the international level, represented by Spinoza and Hegel,
argued that contracts would be valid only so long as they contributed
to the welfare of the state, thereby undermining international law.
The present theory of international law seems to adhere to the
phrase pacta sunt servanda, and considers the binding force of contracts as an obligation which exists, not only vis-4-vis the contracting
69
parties, but also vis-di-vis the international community as a whole.
Particularly pertinent in the present context is article V of the
Charter of the Organization of American States, of which both Panama and the United States are active members. This article states that
international order is based, among other things, upon the faithful
fulfillment of the obligations arising from treaties and from other
sources of international law.
Regardless of the world community's interest in the sanctity of
international agreements, however, the fact is that agreements are
not always obeyed. They are frequently terminated, and in the
absence of an appropriate world arena and institution for the performance of this function, it is performed largely by the parties to
the agreements, making application of certain inherited doctrines.
These doctrines authorize termination both by new agreement between
the parties based on mutual consent and by unilateral decision without the consent of some parties.
More difficulty is presented in attempting to justify unilateral decision without the consent of all parties. The doctrine rebus sic
stantibus has developed in response to this need. This doctrine has
had various formulations, some based on the original intention of
ties and the Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus, 19 IoWA L. Rzv. 312 (1933-1934).
67. BcIG~s, THE LAW OF NATIONS 918 (2d ed. 1952).
68. Wehburg, PactaSunt Servanda, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 775 (1959).
69. Id. at 782.
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the parties, some requiring resort to independent international tribunals, and so on.70 The practice of states clearly indicates, however,

that such bases are not required; and it has been suggested that, in
the absence of appropriate international institutions, it is better to
accept this practice as a matter of preference and to recognize this
doctrine in its most flexible formulation, relying upon the ordinary
sanctions of reciprocity and retaliation to minimize its abuse. 71 Thus
formulated, the doctrine may be justified only when the circumstances
existing at the time of entering into the contract have changed to
such an extent that either contracting party has the right to demand
the revision or termination of the contract -a right which must be
exercised in good faith. It must be emphasized that the doctrine
does not condone arbitrary termination or alteration.
Various bases for unilateral Panamanian decisions have been advanced. One basis, which Panama has intimated at various times over
the years but has never pressed (due, she suggests, to fear of United
States power), is that of violation by the United States. Although
violation of the Treaty by the United States would not have automatically terminated the Treaty, there is considerable doctrinal support for the view that Panama could by her own unilateral act terminate the Treaty as between herself and the United States for the
alleged violations.72 This view, which is supported by many writers,
has been approved by the United States courts. 73 It is of great importance to note, considering that Panama never formally pressed
claims on such a basis, that in each of the cases the courts held that,
although the treaties involved might be voidable because of violation
by the other party, the injured parties had failed to exercise in a
timely manner their rights to terminate the treaties, and the courts
regarded them as remaining in force.7 4 Thus, Panama would seem
to have been precluded from using this argument as it related to
past violations.
Other bases which have been argued by various parties in various
situations, none of which is applicable to the Panamanian-United
States Treaty, are the severance of diplomatic relations,7

changes in

70. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft, Art. 28 Rebus Sic Stantibus,
The Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 1096-1126 (Supp. 1935).
71. McDougal, Lasswell & Burke, The Public Order of the World Community
at 348 (unpublished teaching materials in Yale Law School Library).
72. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft, Art. 27 Violation of Treaty
Obligations, The Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 1077, 1081-84 (Supp. 1935).
73. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 199, 261 (1796); In re Thomas, 23 Fed.
Cas. 927 (No. 13,887) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 473
(1913).
74. Harvard Research, supra note 72, at 1077-96.
75. Presumably, the severance of relations by Panama in the wake of the
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extent of territory, changes in governmental institutions in one of
the parties, the extinction of a state party to the agreement, nonperformance by the other party, and war.
One is brought finally to a consideration of the claim which is
potentially most significant in the termination category: The Canal
is subject to nationalization, a unilateral practice and prescription of
the ownership of and the exclusive competence over the waterway.
Where such action has been taken, notably with regard to Iran's
oil fields and the Suez Canal, it has usually been justified by an Hegelian argument that an agreement would be valid only so long as it
contributed to the welfare of the state, rather than on a strict rebus
sic stantibus basis. Thus Iran argued that "the oil resources of Iran,
like its soil, its rivers and mountains, are the property of the people
They are part of the foundations on which stand our
of Iran ....
national sovereignty," and this patrimony could not be bargained away
by officials.7 8 On this same theory Egypt asserted that irrespective of
the concessions act, the state could not be replaced in computing the
demands of public interest."7 This was a state's exclusive right, which
could not in any circumstances or under any condition be relinquished
or resigned.
It is necessary to note at the outset that the various acts of
nationalization invariably have been taken as acts within the "sovereignty" of the nationalizing nation-state. The claim asserted by the
Egyptian Government was that the nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company for a public purpose, accompanied by an offer to pay compensation, was a legitimate exercise of the power of sovereignty, and
was a matter which fell within its domestic jurisdiction.78 This raises
the basic issue of who is sovereign in the Canal Zone, for the trend of
decisions indicates that the lawfulness of nationalization under both
public and private international law depends upon sovereignty. The
article III grant to the United States of Canal Zone sovereignty "in
perpetuity" would have proved a difficult obstacle to overcome had
Panama attempted nationalization during the life of the 1903 Treaty.79
1964 riots would benefit only the United States in this respect.
76. U.N. SECURrrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 6th year, 560th meeting 6 (S/PV.560)

(1951).
77. HATEM, FACTS ABOUT THE SuEz
FACTs AND DOCUMENTS 153 (1956).
78. U.N. Szcurry COUNCIL OFF. REc.

CANAL

AND

NATIONALIZATION,

CANAL

11th year, 736th meeting 2 (S/PV.736)

(1956).
79. For these arguments see Benedetti, El Problema de la Soberania en la Zona
del Canal, 2 UNIVERSIDAD DE PANAMA ANUARIO DE DERECHO 239-47 (1961-1962);
FAbrega, La Cuesti6n de Soberanta en la Zona del Canal. 2 UNIVMIDAD DE PANAMA
ANUAwo DE D.ERECHo 205-24 (1956-1957); Testa, Nuestra Bandera y Nuestra Soberanta en la Zona del Canal, 5 UNIVERSIDAD DE PANAMA ANUARIO DE DERECHO 249-52
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The various arguments she has advanced to prove retention of certain
attributes of sovereignty will be passed over, however, in view of the
express recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone
in the proposed treaty.
Assuming this difficulty were overcome, under either treaty Panama
would face the difficulty of analogizing the concession agreements
involved in prior nationalizations and the international treaties governing the Panama Canal.80 This would be an exceedingly arduous
task for the trend of decision indicates that a concession agreement is
not a treaty. 81 The Permanent Court of International Justice recognized this distinction in the Chorzow Factory case,8 2 in which the
nationalization of a factory was held illegal on the basis of direct
violation of a treaty, but recognized the competence of a nation-state
over nationalization of property within its territory granted as a concession. A concession has been distinguished from a treaty as primarily
an international economic development contract, or an instrument of
coordination whereby a state and a foreign investor establish a complementary system of economic relationships for a period defined by
the instrument8 3 By definition, then, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty is
in a major respect outside the context of previous nationalizations
which have invariably involved concessions.
A related issue is that of ownership. Here again Panama is faced
with a unique situation. Under the 1903 Treaty the United States
Government, rather than a private company, is the sole owner and
operator of the Panama Canal Company. Under the proposed treaty
the United States Government will still be the major investor and
presumably will bear the larger responsibility for its operation. Since
the Panama Canal Company is and will remain at least partially an
instrument of the United States Government, the nationalization of
the waterway would involve only public international law instead of
both private and public international law, as has been the case in
prior instances of nationalization. And, as noted previously, public
international law does not authorize a nation-state to nationalize local
assets in violation of a treaty as opposed to a concession agreement.
Bearing in mind the legal difficulties Panama must overcome in
justification of nationalization, consideration will now be given to the
(1961-1962). See also speech by Minister of Foreign Relations Miguel J. Moreno, Jr.,
Nov. 28, 1959 in La Politica Exterior de Panama 67-75 (1960).
80. For an attempt to so do see Panamanian Academy of International Law,
Declaracion sobre los canales de Suez y Panama, 2 UNIVERSIDAD DE PANAMA ANUARIO
DE DFRECHO 225-27 (1956-1957).
81. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 109 (1948).
82. P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 17, at 46, 47 (1928).
83. Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 Am. J. INT'L L.
260 (1958).
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points most pertinent to the Panama Canal situation which were
raised in prior nationalizations and expropriations. The situation
which has created a spate of analogies is, of course, the nationalization
of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956.84 Upon close analysis, however,
one finds the differences in the two situations more marked than the
similarities. It has already been noted that there was no question
as to Egypt's complete sovereignty over the Suez Canal; also noted was
the fact that the Universal Suez Company held merely a concession for
operation of a canal, not a grant of territory. And though Egypt's
opponents argued that the Suez Canal had acquired international
status by virtue of the 1888 Constantinople Convention on neutrality
and other factors, such as the international composition of the shareholders of the company, personnel, and manner of operation of the
Canal,8 5 strong proof was adduced by Egypt of her own ownership
of the Canal, of the Egyptian national character of the Universal
Suez Company and of its submission to Egyptian law.86 Surely
Panama could not have adduced proof sufficient to overcome the dissimilarities in the two situations.
One of the grounds utilized by Egypt as a justification for nationalization was that the Universal Suez Company did not maintain the
Canal properly and did not carry out needed expansion.8 7 Again a
difference between Panama and Suez is apparent, for the Universal
Suez Company was expressly bound by the concession agreement to
expand facilities and to maintenance of a specified degree. The HayBunau-Varilla Treaty contains no similar provisions. Furthermore,
in practice the Panama Canal Company has continually improved and
expanded service and facilities.88 It is unlikely that such a pattern
will be disrupted when the proposed treaty becomes effective.
Finally, in discussing the Suez nationalization, it is necessary to
mention the role of the United Nations and its judicial organ, the
International Court of Justice. As a means of ending the armed
conflict which began after Egypt seized control of the Suez Canal on
July 26, 1956, the United Nations arranged a ceasefire that is policed
by a "peace-keeping" force, known as the United Nations Emergency
Force, which has become a long-term enterprise. More important,
84. See authorities cited note 79 supra.
85. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. l1th year, 735th meeting 3-24 (S/PV.B5)

(1956).
86. U.N.

SEcUarrY COUNCIL OFF. REC.

11th year, 736th meeting 1-14 (S/PV.736)

(1956).
87. HATEM, op. cit. supranote 77, at 90.

88. See -each PANAMA CANAL COMPANY AND CANAL ZONE GOVERNMENT ANN.
REP. under heading "Canal Improvement Program." The most spectacular recent
improvement is the $20 million Thatcher Ferry Bridge, a fixed bridge across the
Panama Canal mouth on the Pacific side. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1962, p. 82, col. 6.
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for purposes of this article, in April 1957, as a sequel to its seizure
of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian Government deposited with the
United Nations a declaration stating how it proposed to operate the
Canal. It pledged itself to abide by the Convention of 1888 that
established the international character of the Canal's use. In a later
declaration, on July 18, Egypt formally recognized as compulsory the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes
that might arise over the interpretation of the Convention or other
treaty provisions relating to the Canal. 9
Probably the most pertinent instance of nationalization, from
Panama's standpoint, is that of the Iranian oil fields and oil industry
in 1951. Here again, however, one finds a situation in which a
private company of international character was operating under a
concession granted by a nation-state which is admittedly sovereign in
the territory concerned. Oil-rich Iran contracted with the AngloIranian Oil Company, of which the British Government was the
majority stockholder, for the operation of the oil industry within its
territory. After the company had made substantial investments of
capital and techniques in the development of Iran's oil industry, the
Iranian Government nationalized the foreign-owned enterprise in an
exercise of its sovereignty. 90 The British Government began proceedings against Iran in the International Court of Justice and the
Court granted an interim measure of relief designed to maintain the
status quo until the merits of the jurisdictional argument were decided. The Court finally decided that it lacked jurisdiction in the
matter under the optional clause because of the reservations made by
Iran at the time she acceded to jurisdiction under that clause. Since
the concessionary contract could not be categorized as a treaty, the
Court held that it was unable to exercise jurisdiction.91
Even though the Court refused to consider the case on its merits,
its jurisdictional determination holds important implications in the
event Panama nationalized the Canal and the United States sought
relief before the Court. First, the Connally Reservation92 attached to
the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction may be used
89. COYLE, THE UNITD NATIONS 114 (1960).
90. FORD, THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DispuTE OF 1951-52 (1954).
91. Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89.
92. The Connally Reservation provides that the United States unilaterally
may determine which matters are within its domestic jurisdiction, and thus outside
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. For conflicting views of the
Connally Reservation, the repeal of which has been recommended by the A.B.A.
House of Delegates, see Collier, Judicial World Supremacy and the Connally
Reservation, 47 A.B.A.J. 63 (1961); Gambrell, The United Nations, the World
Court, and the Connally Reservation, id. at 57; Ober, The Connally Reservation
and National Security, id. at 63.
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against the United States by Panama in denying jurisdiction (due to
the reciprocity implied in such a reservation); second, the Court would
certainly be dealing with an international treaty rather than a concessionary agreement, and, assuming both nations acknowledged the
Court's jurisdiction as to treaty interpretation, the Court would not
be able to avoid deciding the controversy on the jurisdictional grounds
of the Anglo-Iranian situation.
As a final observation on the case, it should be noted that Britain
turned to the Security Council for help, but without success. 93 It is
doubtful that the United States would find much help in the Council
under similar circumstances.
Some mention should be made of the petroleum and agrarian expropriations by Mexico in the 1930's and of the recent Cuban expropriations in almost every economic area. It is important to recognize that in both cases the expropriations dealt with privately owned
enterprises, not enterprises owned by the United States Government
and operated under an international treaty.
In the case of the Mexican expropriations, the United States
agreed that any government had the sovereign right to expropriate
private property within its borders in furtherance of public purposes. 94
The United States insisted, however, that legality depended* upon
adequate and prompt compensation.5 The demand of promptness
would seem to have little meaning, however, since Mexico was allowed twenty-five years in which to pay for the 1938 expropriation of
foreign oil companies.
The necessity of adequate and prompt compensation seems even
more questionable as a result of the Cuban expropriations. Again,
the United States recognized Cuba's right to expropriate private
property owned by foreigners, conditioned upon adequate and prompt
compensation.1s Apparently there have been few instances of compensation and present Cuban conditions militate against payment of
compensation in the foreseeable future. The inaction of the United
States under such circumstances is perhaps indicative of a broader
9
trend. 7
93. Shiwadran, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1948-1953, 5 MIDDLE EASTERN
AFFAiRs 193, 214 (1954).
94. 5 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 399, 400 (1941).
95. Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations,17 N.Y.U.L. REv. 327 (1940).
96. In protesting against expropriation of real property under the Cuban
Agrarian Reform Law, the State Department expressed its support of soundly
conceived land reform programs, but stated that "their attainment is not furthered
by the failure of the Government of Cuba to recognize the legal rights of United
States citizens who have made investments in Cuba in reliance upon the adherence

of the Government of Cuba to principles of equity and justice." 42 DEP'T

STATE

BULL. 158 (1960).
97. The Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1110 (1964), 22 U.S.C.A.

§1643
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Opponents of nationalization of the Suez Canal made much of
the argument that Egypt was incapable of operating the Canal. To
meet the expected breakdown the Canal Users' Association was established. 98 This proved to be an unnecessary step, for the Egyptian
Canal Authority has functioned quite successfully. Nevertheless, it is
to be expected that the same argument would be voiced were Panama
to nationalize the Panama Canal, and with better reason, for men
with far more skill are required for the operation of the Panama
Canal with its complex locks than for the sea-level Suez Canal.
Other opposition would probably center upon Panama's financial
limitations. In this respect it is pertinent that the World Bank has
lent large sums to Egypt for widening and deepening the Suez Canal,
and Panama might find help from the same source. The qualification
must be noted, however, that Egypt received such aid from the World
Bank only after four years' proof that she was capable of running the
Canal. It is possible, of course, that financing might be undertaken
by some one foreign government or an international consortium,
either private or public. 99
If a projection were made purely on the basis of past decisions,
there would seem to be little chance for Panama to successfully terminate the 1903 Treaty or its proposed successor by unilateral decision. There is little in the legal arguments made in prior nationalizations to justify similar action by Panama. Such a projection ignores
(Supp. 1964), which amends the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 by
adding a new Title V authorizing the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to
receive and determine in accordance with applicable substantive law, including
international law, the amount and validity of certain claims by United States
nationals against the Government of Cuba, is unique in its provision for adjudication of claims for purposes of evaluation only; the act contains no provision relating to any decision as to the time, form, or manner of payment of eventual
compensation. See H.R. REP. No. 1759, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964). For the
suggestion that underdeveloped nations, or nations desiring to reorganize their
economic or social structures, are entitled to deal with foreign investments in a
manner not permitted to the capital exporting countries, see Baade, The Problems
of Expropriation: A Study of the Issues, 11 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Comp. 86 (1960)
and Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 709
(1951). Also pertinent in this context is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
98. WATT, DOCUMENTS ON THE SUEZ CRISIS 16 (1956).
99. See report in The N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1964, §1, p. 3, col. I, that France
has expressed interest in promoting a new canal across the Isthmus and that private
investors in Tokyo have also shown considerable interest in such a venture. Presumably an expansion and conversion of the present canal under Panamanian
control would interest them if indeed it is more economic to expand and convert
than to build anew elsewhere. Another possibility is financing by ADELA (the
acronym for the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America), a
new and wide-ranging consortium of private business corporations and big banks.
N.Y. Times, July 4, 1965, §3, p. 1, col. 7.
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the most important factor of all, however; that factor is the strident
nationalism sweeping the world's less developed countries. Although
the United States would seem to have the force of the law on its
side, little aid could be expected from the United Nations, its Security Council, or the World Court, nor, for varied reasons, would the
United States likely find much support in the court of public opinion. 00o Thus the United States would be reduced to the use of the
strategy of coercion. That the United States, using such a strategy,
could prevail is unquestioned; whether it would use it, and in sufficient degree, is problematical.' 0 '
THE NEw TREATY

Why is the United States discussing a treaty revision if there is no
legal compulsion to so do? On September 24, 1965, President Johnson
dramatically announced: "In order to meet their present and future
needs the two countries are negotiating separately a new and modern
treaty to replace the 1903 Treaty and its amendments . . . . and a
treaty under which there might be constructed across Panama a new
sea-level canal."'1 2 As recently as February 14, 1964, in a Voice of
America radio interview, Secretary of State Rusk had said, when
asked about the need for a sea-level canal: "It may be decades before
one is needed. It certainly will be at least a decade before one could
be built, and that would require careful negotiation with a country
or countries about engineering surveys and sites and costs and things
100. See, for example, the resolution supporting Panama's demand for a new
canal treaty adopted by the recently formed Latin-American Parliament, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1964, §1, p. 76, col. 1. The executive committee of this same
group met in Lima in November 1965 to condemn the United States House of
Representatives' resolution discussed in note 46 supra. It is also unlikely that the
United States would be supported in the U.N. by its traditional allies, France and
Great Britain, in view of the lack of United States support for them during the
Suez crisis. See Krock, The Panama Crisis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1964, §4, p. 13,
col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, p. 24, col. 4.
101. See report of retired Chief of Naval Operations Burke's speech in which
he explores the United States "guilt complex" about using power. N.Y. Times,
April 17, 1962, p. 72, col. 1. Though at first glance the United States presence in
Santo Domingo would seem to give the lie to Admiral Burke's thesis that "we
have become dangerous to the world" because of what he called an unrealistic
desire to "have peace without the use of power," it actually supports his further
allegation that "no one really knows what we will do because we ourselves do not
know." Certainly the inconsistency of our use of power in Cuba, Suez, Korea,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Angola, Panama, and now in Santo Domingo indicates a
"paradox of policy." See Geyelin, The Irksome Panama Wrangle, The Reporter,
April 9, 1964, p. 14; Krock, The Panama Crisis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1964, §4, p.
13, col. 1.
102. See APPENDIX.
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of that sort.'' °3 Mr. Rusk's comments ignored completely the fact
that the June 1962 talks in Washington with Panamanian representatives were expressly premised on a contemplated sea-level canal.",
Senator Fulbright, in his now famous "Old Myths and New Realities"
speech in the Senate on March 25, 1964, listed among the "myths"
still cluttering United States foreign policy the "myth" that there is
"something morally sacred" about the 1903 Treaty on the Panama
Canal.105 Mr. Fulbright said it was preposterous to regard United
States honor and prestige at stake in a controversy with a small,
weak nation such as Panama, and he saw no reason why the United
States should balk at renegotiating the 1903 Treaty. The White
House called Mr. Fulbright's views "very interesting" but said that
the speech did not "represent the policy of the Administration on
Panama."106
What accounts for this sudden reversal in Administration policy?
Have the needs of the United States for a sea-level canal changed so
rapidly? During the 1964 Hammarskj6ld Forum on the Panama
Canal, a question from the floor was addressed to Mr. Farland,
United States Ambassador to Panama in the years 1960-1963:107
If there is no question but that a treaty with Panama drawn
up today would recognize the rights of the traversed country
to sovereignty and to partnership with the United States, why
would it not be a dramatic reassertion of our renewed moral
leadership in the world for President Johnson to say: "Now
we want to treat with you on the basis of the international
mores of today, your retained sovereignty, and our partnership
with you"?
The Ambassador replied:
I think we should take such a position. Ours is the greatest
country in the world. We cannot be minimal in our approach,
especially to a smaller nation.
Perhaps Professor Baxter, speculating during the same forum about
the future of the Canal and the possibility of a new canal, forecast
President Johnson's announcement and at the same time clarified
the goals such a policy is intended to achieve: "If the usable life of
103.

Voice of America radio interview, Feb. 14, 1964, 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 330,

335 (1964).
104. As stated by ex-Ambassador Farland, THE SIXTH

HAMMARSKJ6LD FORUM,

PANAMA CANAL 57 (1965).

105. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1964, §4, p. 1, col. 4.
106. Ibid.
107. THE SIXTH HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM, supra note 104, at 58.
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the existing Panama Canal is limited, perhaps a holding operation is
called for, in which there might be a graceful yielding to some of
Panama's demands, at the same time that the United States maintains
its control over the Canal Zone."' 08 This somewhat cynical proposal
is compatible with Baxter's emphasis upon bargaining when he seeks
to locate himself between the two extremes of doing justice and of
bargaining. Unfortunately there is support for such an emphasis in
President Johnson's choice of words: "a treaty under which there
might be constructed across Panama a new sea-level canal." (Emphasis added.) That the word "might" conceals a lightly veiled threat
intended as a counter in the bargaining seems all too probable in light
of the near-unanimous agreement that the new canal will indeed transit Panama.109 Such a conclusion is buttressed by the publicity accorded the search for "alternate" trans-istbmian routes both at the
time of the President's original pronouncement and during the
months since.110
In the area of international relations it is frequently difficult to
explain momentous decisions in terms of traditional legal norms. It
is all too easy for the moralist to explain President Johnson's decision
as simply a change of heart or a long overdue recognition of Panama's
right to join the United States in shaping and sharing the values inherent in the isthmian enterprise; the pragmatist, with equal facility,
can explain it in Professor Baxter's terms as a "holding operation."
Each is at once both right and wrong.
Is there, after all, an explanation satisfactory in terms of international legal norms? It is submitted that there is: the developing
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has won the day. Conditions have indeed changed and though the President has not invoked the doctrine
explicitly in reaching his decision, it is implicit in his every pronouncement. But one must realize that this unusual departure from
the norm of pacta sunt servanda is not altogether altruistic. In the
not too distant future the present canal will be outmoded, and, unless
the new canal closely parallels the present one, it will be abandoned.
Thus the United States would find itself in the position of seeking
termination of a "perpetual" treaty. At such a juncture it would be to
Panama's economic advantage to argue pacta sunt servanda; the
108. Id. at 42.
109. Stratton, Sea-Level Canal: How and Where, 43 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 513-18
(1965); Miami Herald, Feb. 7, 1965, §H, p. 5, col. 1.
110. See references cited note 109 supra. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1964,
§1, p. 1, col. 5; Id. §4, p. 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1964, p. 26, col. 1. For
report of bitter Panamanian reaction to the announcement on April 16, 1964, by
President Johnson that the United States and Colombia had agreed to begin an
immediate study of the feasibility of a sea-level canal to be cut through Colombian
territory, see N.Y. Times, April 18, 1964, p. 10, col. 3.
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United States would have to adopt explicitly Panama's old argument
of rebus sic stantibus. Such a reversal and such explicit approval of a
doctrine, which, more often than not, would be inimical to the interests of a nation powerful enough to arrange treaties generally weighted
in its favor, has been avoided by the current willingness to negotiate.
In addition to this long-term advantage, the United States, in implementing its present policy, has reaped a dividend in the ideological
controversy.

APPENDIX
TEXT OF JOINT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON PROGRESS OF
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
September 24, 1965
The President of the United States of America and the President of the Republic of Panama announced today that areas of agreement have been reached in
the current treaty negotiations along the following lines:
In order to meet their present and future needs the two countries are negotiating separately a new and modern treaty to replace the 1903 Treaty and its
amendments - a base rights and status of forces agreement - and a treaty under
which there might be constructed across Panama a new sea level canal.
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The two countries recognize that the primary interest of both countries lies
in ensuring that arrangements are provided for effective operation and defense of
the existing Panama Canal and any new canal which may be constructed in
Panama in the future.
With respect to the status of the negotiations on a new treaty to replace the
1903 Treaty and its amendments, general areas of agreement have been reached.
The details of these areas of agreement are the subject of current negotiations.
The purpose is to ensure that Panama will share with the United States responsibility in the administration, management and operation of the Canal as
may be provided in the treaty. Panama will also share with the United States in
the direct and indirect benefits from the existence of the Canal on its territory.
The areas of agreement reached are the following:
1. The 1903 Treaty will be abrogated.
2. The new treaty will effectively recognize Panama's sovereignty over
the area of the present Canal Zone.
3. The new treaty will terminate after a specified number of years or
on the date of the opening of the sea level canal whichever occurs first.
4. A primary objective of the new treaty will be to provide for an
appropriate political, economic and social integration of the area used in
the canal operation with the rest of the Republic of Panama. Both countries recognize there is need for an orderly transition to avoid abrupt and
possibly harmful dislocations. We also recognize that certain changes should
be made over a period of time. The new canal administration will be empowered to make such changes in accordance with guidelines in the new
treaty.
5. Both countries recognize the important responsibility they have to
be fair and helpful to the employees of all nationalities who are serving
so efficiently and well in the operation of the canal. Appropriate arrangements will b& made to ensure that the rights and interests of these employees
are safeguarded.
The new treaties will provide for the defense of the existing canal and any sea
level canal which may be constructed in Panama. United States forces and military
facilities will be maintained under a base rights and status of forces agreement.
With respect to the sea level canal, the United States will make studies and
site surveys of possible routes in Panama. Negotiations are continuing with respect
to the methods and conditions of financing, constructing and operating a sea level
canal, in the light of the importance of such a canal to the Republic of Panama,
to the United States of America, to world commerce and to the progress of mankind.
The United States and Panama will seek the necessary solutions to the economic problems which would be caused by the construction of a sea level canal.
The present canal and any new canal which may be constructed in the future

shall be open at all times to the vessels of all nations on a non-discriminatory
basis. The tolls would be reasonable in the light of the contribution of the Republic of Panama and the United States of America and of the interest of world
commerce.
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